The unyielding, intransigent and aggressive policy of Turkey, the supposed signs of negotiation and joint trilateral and five-party meetings under the auspices of the UN, and the constant and pressing position of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots that the only solution is partition and the apparent annexation of the occupied territories, through a Northern Cyprus, to Turkey — all these make the present appear as a resounding and deafening tragedy, following the rejection of the Annan Plan, 21 years ago.
In the previous article, we mentioned that with the Annan Plan we would now have a Federation of two states, with political arrangements that maintained balance, with two states accountable to the Federation — a system that has prevailed in Switzerland and has yielded excellent results.
Let us now look, beyond political reality, at the practical issues concerning citizens and their rights. Again, the Annan Plan prevails over current conditions, with the only negotiating leverage being the fact that Greek Cyprus is a member of the EU, on behalf of all Cypriots.
The complex property provisions of the Annan Plan included restoration, compensation and exchange. Greek Cypriots displaced in 1974 from territories to be placed under the control of the constituent state would get their properties back. Those not entitled to return to their homes would receive compensation in guaranteed bonds based on the market values at the time of their loss, adjusted to reflect the appreciation in property values since then.
All other displaced owners would have the right to restore one third of the value and one third of the area of their total property and receive compensation for the rest. Among other provisions, current users of properties originally owned by displaced Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who had made “significant improvements” to a property could apply for title to it, provided they paid for the value of the property in its original state. Cypriot citizens required to vacate properties for restoration would not have to do so until suitable alternative housing was provided.
The three Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance of 1960 would remain in effect. Britain, Greece and Turkey would continue as guarantor powers. In the event of acceptance of the Annan Plan, Britain declared it would relinquish nearly half of the 98 square miles of land covered by its two sovereign military bases under the Treaty of Establishment.
A gradual demilitarisation of Cyprus would follow. All Cypriot security forces would be dissolved, while Greece and Turkey would be allowed to maintain up to 6,000 troops in Cyprus until 2011, to be reduced to 3,000 by 2018 or earlier if Turkey joined the EU before that date. Thereafter, the numbers would be reduced to the original 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops provided for under the 1960 Treaty of Alliance. This would be reviewed every three years with the aim of eventual complete withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish forces.
The Annan Plan was the most tangible and rigorous proposal ever presented for negotiation and acceptance regarding the Cyprus issue. Any rejection of it by either of the two communities participating in the April 2004 referendum might be later regretted as a reckless abandonment of reality or seen as patriotic but maximalist dreaming that extended far beyond its limits. As expected, Cypriot communities around the world were once again divided over the referendum outcome, depending on ideological lines and place of origin.
Everything conspired to trigger a fanatical outburst. The fires of discord burned fiercely once more. The more moderate, the sceptical, the unaffiliated, were soon lost. The doctrine of resistance against the plan gained the upper hand. The maximalists prevailed and took leadership. They expressed their views in public spaces and dominated.
The divergence of opinions was also strong in Greece, where political leaders were divided, with supporters of the “Yes” stance gaining ground there. Also, many Greek Cypriots believed that the demand for the Cyprus issue to be resolved before Cyprus’ EU accession was so that reunification would not have to contain elements of European law incompatible with certain provisions of the Annan Plan.
On the other hand, as expected, the nationalistic ambitions of Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to increase its territorial ambitions and colonise the occupied part of northern Cyprus led its leaders, by February 2022, to consider any solution based on a “federal state”, as outlined in the Annan Plan, now as “outdated and off the table”. Instead, they were now focusing on “solving” the Cyprus problem through partition, creating two separate states on the island and thereby legitimising revenue from natural gas exploration on an equal footing.
Meanwhile, the aftermath of the resulting crisis, stemming from the failure of the 2004 referendum, was felt in Cyprus, Greece, and the Greek diaspora through exchanges of vitriolic articles in Greek-language newspapers, letters with unfortunate content, uprisings at gatherings, and noisy assemblies.
Turkey and the leaders of the Turkish community know well that no other country besides Turkey is willing to recognise the TRNC of 1983 as an independent sovereign state on an island which, as a whole, is accepted as a member of the European Union. They are also aware that Greek Cypriots have no reason to accept forms or types of minimalist settlement, because they are accepted by the world as the Republic of Cyprus on their own and can thus enjoy the benefits of recognition independently. Why should they ever accept anything less than that?
Finally, it is also a political and legal fact that individually, Turkish Cypriots have secured for themselves passports and identity cards from the Republic of Cyprus, which means that even if they refuse to recognise the Republic as their state, under global political and legal standards they are still its citizens, with all the consequences that entails.
It is also true that many negotiations have taken place to resolve the Cyprus issue. Since peace talks began in Beirut in 1968, seven UN Secretaries-General have held office, including Guterres. Also, during this time, leadership has changed five times on the Turkish side and seven times on the Greek side, including the current leaders. At least six special envoys for Cyprus and heads of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus have been appointed by the UN.
Since 2018, Cyprus has launched joint military exercises and training with the United States, sent its first security attaché to Washington, and begun accepting US troops and ships. In December 2021, the US Secretary of State declared that “the cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Cyprus is at a historic high.”
Furthermore, due to the shifting political dynamics on the island, UN leadership, following the last round of substantial negotiations at the Swiss resort of Crans-Montana in 2017, remained optimistic, stating that: “The essence of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue is practically there. The parties had come close to reaching strategic understanding on security and guarantees, as well as on all other outstanding core elements of a comprehensive settlement.” However, a senior diplomat with deep knowledge of the talks stated that “the remaining open issues from Crans-Montana… are insignificant.”
Finally, of historic importance is also the decision by the United States to fully lift the arms embargo that had been imposed on the Republic of Cyprus, reflecting the good relations of American foreign policy with Cyprus. However, any solution to the Cyprus problem that would lead to its reunification remains clouded, given the current political and strategic structure and the diplomatic progress made. This results in the missed opportunity of 2004 being seen as a loss and a tragedy.
