The rejection by referendum on 24 April 2004 of the settlement plan of the UN by the Greek Cypriots had negatively influenced the international organisations and services, expressing their disappointment.
Three days after the referendums, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia, Alexander Downer, issued an urgent press release expressing the disappointment of Australia and “the appreciation of Australia for the extensive efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General of the UN for the finding of a solution to the dispute.”
However, the diplomatic setback and the deadlock which followed the rejection of the Plan of the United Nations by the Greek Cypriot community was counterbalanced partly by the entry of Cyprus into the EU and the examination of its Foreign Ministers to ensure that all Cypriots could benefit from the economic, political benefits and the benefits of security which the accession to the EU provided.
The reaction of Turkey, awaiting its reasonable accession to the EU, was rather cautious, trying to promote a cooperative image and admitting its commitment “to continue the comprehensive reforms which must be undertaken for the further strengthening of democracy.”
Despite the political numbness that the referendums had caused in Canberra, FECCA successfully intensified its efforts to persuade the government of John Howard of Australia to maintain the position of the Special Envoy of Australia, Jim Short, as well as the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus.
Panicos Minas in his letters to the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Downer (22 November 2004) and to the Australian senators (18 November 2004), advocated in favour of Jim Short, “who is very well informed about the Cyprus issue” and maintains “excellent relations with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community.”
Meanwhile, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders in Melbourne, the capital of the state with the greatest concentration of Cypriots, continued their contacts for rapprochement, which were becoming over time more numerous and more widely accepted. The idea of a reunited Cyprus remained strongly patriotic among them and tended to provoke the critical zeal of both the older and the younger members, including those who had no experience of a united Cyprus. Important also was the moral and political support of those who had overcome the difficult period of the communal disturbances (1962–1964), as they could exercise deep influence.
Erdil Nami, former policeman in the Republic of Cyprus, in 1964 was arrested and detained by militant Turkish insurgents in Nicosia because he refused to act “patriotically.” He was released by the Cypriot forces and offered protection and a safe harbour first in Germany and later in Sydney of Australia. His grandson, Erdin Nami, in recent years, was elected Turkish Cypriot negotiator and president of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and played a key role in the discussions for rapprochement.
During this period, those Turkish Cypriot leaders who committed to rapprochement included Tümer Mimi, the daughter of Nitel Mimi, Ali Genc and his brother Kubilay Genc, Aygan Ozkan, Yalcin Adal, Niyazi Okten, Halil Adal, Yuksel Adal, the brothers Ismail and Zac Ulusoy, Erdil Nami, while several other politicians, including the MP Natalie Suleiman and Sam Davet, declared an understanding for a united Cyprus. With equality and justice for all.
The organised leaders of FECCA and its president P. Minas had found common ground with the Turkish Cypriot leaders on issues of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. Thus, when at the beginning of November 2005 it was announced by the Turkish MP Egemen Bagis that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan planned an official visit to Australia in December 2005, the members of the rapprochement group acted with caution and mutual respect. Understanding and common sense found their way in their discussions and consultations.
According to Bagis, “part of the political agenda of [Erdoğan] is to request measures from the Australian government for the termination of the so-called ‘isolation of the Turkish Cypriots,’ including the invitation to the Turkish Cypriot leader and so-called ‘president of the TRNC,’ Mehmet Ali Talat to visit Australia.”
Minas and FECCA in response brought the issue to the Australian Prime Minister, informing his office that the so-called “isolation of the Turkish Cypriots” was nothing other than a self-imposed political tool from Turkey for the promotion of a separate state entity in the occupied northern part of Cyprus. Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriot entities residing in the diaspora, including Australia, continued their series of rapprochements for a reunited Cyprus that convened at the Conference of Istanbul on 27–29 December 2006. They met at the Richmond Hotel in Istanbul “to launch a new dialogue away from the negative atmosphere prevailing in Cyprus and to discuss the immediate steps that must be taken with the aim of the solution.”
The ideological differences between those who supported Union and those of an Independent Cyprus maintained their momentum in Australia, but with weakened intensity, after the second decade of the twenty-first century. While the reunification of Cyprus had dominated the processes and the assemblies of the community leaders, the applied terms and preconditions for an acceptable solution proposed by the leaders of the international organisations, including the United Nations and the EU, were met with certain disagreements.
Greek and Cypriot officials and academics mingled and discussed with the leaders of the community. Usually, every proposed plan ended in catastrophe. In several cases, including the Annan Plan, nationalism was successfully imposed upon the Greek Cypriots due to the political dispute that characterised the internal affairs of the Republic. This nationalism was based on maximalist aspirations, which were also cultivated largely due to the accession of Cyprus into the EU and the hostility of the Turks.
The refusal of the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots to accept the Annan Plan in 2004, undoubtedly preserved internationally the universal recognition of its sovereignty over a unified Republic of Cyprus to its benefit, with its unilateral representation internationally and its exclusive global recognition as Republic of Cyprus. It also ensured its status quo, after more than twenty years as a member of the European Union, representing exclusively all its citizens, regardless of race or religion, without providing benefits or special treatment to the Turkish Cypriots of the occupied areas. Exploiting the close Turkocentric policy of Ankara in the occupied areas, as de facto ideologically and politically, the Republic of Cyprus succeeded in the promotion of the reunification of the island as a single, bizonal and federal state structure, in full compliance with the principles of the UN, the European Union and the whole international community.
During the period after Annan, the Cypriots cultivated and reinforced almost exclusively the dialogue with the Turkish Cypriots in Istanbul, London, Nicosia and in the host countries of Cypriot migrants, for the reunification of the island. The Greek Cypriots have organised and realised jointly with the Turkish Cypriots, conferences, musical and sporting contests that encouraged or supported the reunification of the island. However, despite the fact that for decades there has been no intercommunal violence on the island, at least 30,000 Turkish troops remain in the occupied areas, a fact which raises serious concerns for the security of both communities.
Analysing and evaluating the above data, I will conclude in the conclusion that Turkey will no longer be willing to accept a balanced and compromising solution, which would secure the equal treatment of the Turkish Cypriots and their peaceful and harmonious coexistence within a unified federal state structure. Perhaps the Turkish Prime Minister, Mustafa Bülent Ecevit, Kurd by origin, scholar, poet and writer, did not seek such a solution when he took the decision to invade Cyprus 50 years ago. I believe that the goal of Turkey was always to occupy and to detach territories of Cyprus for strategic reasons and to increase its sovereignty.
Reinforcing the goal of annexation of these Cypriot territories, followed the transplantation of thousands of settlers of Anatolia, transforming them into province of Turkey, obviously regardless of whether the Turkish Cypriots who for centuries lived together and experienced the common fate with their Greek Cypriot compatriots, would become finally victims of a colonisation of Anatolia, which deprived them of their right to have a homeland of their own. Most of them will transmit with increasing anguish to their descendants, who dwell in the occupied territories as well as in the diaspora as migrants and refugees, that the invasion of Turkey in Cyprus finally enslaved those whom it was called to liberate.
